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1 
STILL CHASING CHIMERAS BUT 
FINALLY SLAYING SOME DRAGONS 
IN THE QUEST FOR CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY REFORM 
Jason J. Kilborn* 
 
onsumer bankruptcy systems in Europe and the United 
States have witnessed especially robust and dynamic 
development during the past decade. The ever-rising volume of 
seeking entry to these systems now allows for cross-systemic 
comparisons of substantially differing “markets” for the relief that 
these systems offer. In particular, the distinct trend toward 
greater efficiency seen in other financial markets can be 
increasingly observed in most consumer bankruptcy regimes, 
with some notable exceptions. In this context, market 
performance can be gauged in part by the degree to which 
systems offer efficient and effective relief as a stimulus to 
deploying available debtor resources to paying debts while 
reducing waste in fruitless collections activity and avoiding old 
and inefficient shibboleths that prevent the efficient allocation of 
default risk.1 
An evaluation of the performance of consumer bankruptcy 
reform depends in large part upon one’s perspective. Creditors 
will likely never be satisfied with the proliferation and refinement 
                                                          
 * Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School (Chicago), 
jkilborn@jmls.edu.  More detailed studies of the consumer insolvency systems 
and reforms discussed in this paper are available for free download from my 
author page on the Social Science Research Network, 
http://ssrn.com/author=95989. 
 1  For a discussion of some of the most salient goals and purposes of 
modern consumer bankruptcy law, see Jason J. Kilborn et al., THE WORLD 
BANK, Draft Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons 
(2012), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/WBPersonalInsolven
cyReportOct2012DRAFT.pdf; INSOL INTERNATIONAL, CONSUMER DEBT 
REPORT II 1-24 (2011). 
C 
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of systems that impose a coercive end to debt collections, 
conclusively robbing creditors of their right to attempt to extract 
payment from their debtors. Moreover, creditors will likely 
always complain of rampant “abuse” of these systems by debtors 
who are perceived as having the means to pay but otherwise 
lacking the will. But these are among the chimera notions that 
both developing and developed consumer bankruptcy regimes 
have chased relentlessly in the past, at significant and often 
wasted expense to the state and society. Notions of widespread 
abuse of “debtor-friendly” systems indeed fit the definition of 
“chimera,” for they are largely if not entirely “unreal creature[s] of 
the imagination, a mere wild fancy.”2 
This paper examines reforms in six prominent consumer 
bankruptcy systems that have occurred within a little more than 
a decade, evaluating which of them continue to pursue chimeras 
of abuse and which have actually begun to slay some real 
dragons, primarily the twin monsters of inefficiency and waste. It 
reveals whether these reforms have achieved their stated goals of 
improving efficiency and effectiveness, as opposed to chasing 
chimerical abuse. It concentrates on the most salient aspects of 
recent reforms and their effects, particularly the degree to which 
reforms have enhanced the risk-shifting efficiency and 
effectiveness of these systems, developing a more social policy-
oriented concentration on, e.g., fighting social exclusion and 
restraining the anti-social effects of deregulated consumer finance 
markets. Progressing from worst to best, this examination begins 
                                                          
 2  THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, VOL. III, 121 (2d ed. 1989) 
(definition 3(b)). Published evidence of the existence of “abuse” is inevitably 
sparse, since the concept is difficult at best to measure. Informal evaluation of 
systems around the world by actors in those systems uniformly suggests that, 
however abuse might be defined, it infects only a small fraction of cases. 
Where official system supervisors have gauged the incidence of debtor 
misbehavior so serious as to represent abuse, they have confirmed the 
anecdotal accounts.  See, e.g., The Insolvency Service, Annual Report and 
Accounts 2010-11, at 33-35 (2012), available at 
www.bis.gov.uk/assets/insolvency/docs/publication-pdfs/annual2010-
11web.pdf; US Department of Justice, US Trustee Program, Annual Report of 
Significant Accomplishments 2010, at 17-19 (2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/annualreport/index.htm. 
Voluminous academic empirical study has more clearly belied the notion of 
“fraud” in the broader sense of solvent debtors’ attempts to evade their 
obligations. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213 
(2006) (citing earlier studies). 
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with the thoroughly misguided and counterproductive U.S. 
reform of 2005 and ends with the increasingly impressive series of 
reforms implemented in France in 1999, 2004, and 2010. Between 
these poles, the examination progresses through reforms in the 
Netherlands in 2008, Denmark in 2005, Sweden in 2007, and 
Germany in 2002, charting a steadily increasing ratio of positive 
to negative design and result. Overall, the European systems 
seem to have performed quite well. Broadly speaking, the 
European reforms have enhanced efficiency by eliminating 
wasteful formality, targeting appropriate forms of relief to those 
who clearly need it, and appropriately socializing the burdens of 
financial distress and assigning financial market risks to 
sophisticated repeat players better able to gauge and minimize 
those risks. 
 
I.  THE UNMITIGATED DISASTER OF THE U.S. 
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REFORM OF 2005 
 
The mid-1990s saw the first major reform of U.S. 
consumer bankruptcy law since the adoption of the Bankruptcy 
Code in 1978.3  Three factors converged to push an ill-conceived 
and poorly drafted reform bill through the legislative process: (1) 
the ebb and flow of politics had moved toward a more 
conservative position, (2) the general economic situation 
(especially investment asset values, such as home equity and 
stocks) was at all-time highs, and yet (3) annual personal 
bankruptcy filings had exceeded the psychologically important 
one million mark in 1996.4 Empirical evidence demonstrated that 
these filers were overwhelmingly among the exceptional 
casualties of an otherwise robust economy; they were drowning in 
debt with no hope of returning any significant dividend to their 
creditors over a reasonable period. Only the smallest fraction of 
filers might be said to be “abusing” the privilege of debt relief.5 
Nonetheless, credit card lenders and their conservative political 
allies pursued a single-minded campaign of curbing perceived 
abuse by “can-pay” debtors seeking an easy way out of their 
debts. 
                                                          
 3  See, e.g., Jason J. Kilborn, The Hidden Life of Consumer Bankruptcy 
Reform: Danger Signs for the New U.S. Law From Unexpected Parallels in the 
Netherlands, 39 VAND J. TRANSNAT’L L. 77 (2006), at  91, n.7. 
 4  Id. at 109. 
 5  See, e.g., Sullivan et al., supra note 2, and other studies cited therein. 
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A major credit card issuing bank (MBNA) drafted a 
reform bill, and a conservative member of Congress ultimately 
sponsored it.  The reform bill sought to reduce the number of 
bankruptcy filings generally, while identifying “can-pay” debtors, 
denying them access to an immediate discharge in a Chapter 7 
liquidation of their (usually negligible) assets, and offering such 
debtors relief only through a five-year payment plan under 
Chapter 13.6 After a long process of legislative gestation, the 
reform law passed and became effective in October 2005 under 
the misleading name “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act” or BAPCPA (often referred to as “bap-
see-pah”).7 
It is difficult to overstate what a spectacular failure the 
U.S. reform of October 2005 has been, especially in light of the 
subsequent financial and economic crises.  Indeed, at least one 
authoritative commentator has cogently argued that BAPCPA 
exacerbated if not contributed directly to the subprime 
foreclosure crisis and the meltdown of the U.S. housing market, 
which spread to the rest of the world in 2007.8 BAPCPA clearly 
did not solve the supposed problem of “excessive” consumer 
bankruptcy filings. Within five years after the effective date of 
the new law, consumer bankruptcy filings returned to pre-2005 
levels.9 Likewise, the proportion of filings under the immediate-
discharge provisions of Chapter 7 and the payment-plan 
provisions of Chapter 13 have returned to their pre-reform 
relation of about 70:30.10 This data all but conclusively disproves 
                                                          
 6  See Kilborn supra note 3, at 109-110. 
 7  Id. at 110. 
 8  See DONALD P. MORGAN, BENJAMIN IVERSON & MATTHEW BOTSCH, 
SEISMIC EFFECTS OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM (Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Staff Report, Feb. 2009), available at 
www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/ 
sr358.pdf. 
 9  Official statistics report nearly 1.6 million filings in calendar year 2010 
and over 1.4 million in 2011, the vast majority of which were “consumer” 
filings.  See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY 
COURTS––BANKRUPTCY CASES COMMENCED, TERMINATED AND PENDING 
DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2010 AND 2011, 
available at 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings
/2011/1211_f.pdf. 
 10  See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, 2010 REPORT OF 
STATISTICS REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, available at 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
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the hypothesis that any significant number of potential “abusers” 
have self-selected into Chapter 13 payment plans or out of 
bankruptcy relief altogether for fear of running afoul of the more 
rigid entry requirements discussed below. 
Most troubling, BAPCPA not only failed to solve any 
problems, it created a mass of expensive, burdensome, and 
distracting challenges for debtors, their lawyers, trustees, and the 
courts. Three key problems relate to (1) required pre-filing credit 
counseling, (2) the “means test” for ferreting out “abusive” filers, 
and (3) poorly drafted provisions of law that have come to 
dominate the precious time and resources of the courts, including 
the Supreme Court.11 
A.  Required Pre-Bankruptcy Credit Counseling 
Part of the U.S. reform addressed the perception of 
lawmakers that debtors were choosing bankruptcy too hastily, 
without proper consideration of alternatives.12 All available 
empirical evidence indicated strongly that debtors were in fact 
being told about alternatives, but the alternatives were clearly 
insufficient. For at least 30 years, consumer debtors in the United 
States had been delaying or avoiding bankruptcy by trying to 
work things out with their creditors, often with assistance from 
private credit counselors.13 This negotiation and counseling had 
become all but pointless for most debtors by the mid-1990s, 
however, in light of a spectacular rise in debt levels, stagnating 
real incomes for all but the wealthiest Americans, and an 
increasing unwillingness by institutional creditors (primarily 
credit card banks) to offer consumers the scope and nature of 
relief that could stave off a bankruptcy filing.14 
Nonetheless, the 2005 reform bill included an additional 
obligation for any individual seeking relief under any chapter of 
the Bankruptcy Code: within 180 days before filing a bankruptcy 
petition, an individual must attend “an individual or group 
briefing (including a briefing conducted by telephone or on the 
Internet) that outlined the opportunities for available credit 
counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related 
                                                          
BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2010/2010BAPCPA.pdf. 
 11  See Kilborn supra note 3, at 110, 117-18. 
 12  Id. at 111. 
 13  Id. at 84. 
 14  For a more detailed discussion of the rise and fall of credit counseling in 
the United States, see Kilborn, supra note 3, at 84-87. 
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budget analysis.”15 Not surprisingly, this search for alternatives to 
bankruptcy has been an almost complete failure. Credit 
counseling agencies have reported that only about 3% of these 
pre-bankruptcy debtors might find solutions to their problems 
through counseling and budgeting alone, without bankruptcy 
intervention.16 The largely ceremonial “counseling” today usually 
consists of a telephone or internet session in which a counseling 
provider outlines generalized advice, the debtor inputs financial 
information that inevitably demonstrates that bankruptcy is the 
only workable solution to financial trouble spiraling out of 
control, and the counseling agency produces a certificate of 
completion in exchange for a $50 fee. This aspect of the reform 
thus represents little more than a wholesale transfer of wealth 
from insolvent debtors to the credit counseling industry, while 
imposing needless delays on debtors seeking bankruptcy relief. 
B.  The “Means Test” 
The heart of the [2005 U.S.] consumer bankruptcy reforms 
is the so-called “means test,” the explicit aim of which is to 
prevent debtors from receiving an immediate discharge under 
Chapter 7 if they have the “means” to pay a statutorily defined 
dividend to their creditors over a five-year, Chapter 13 payment 
plan.17  This “means test” imposes heavy paperwork burdens on 
debtors and their lawyers, and the system administrators (panel 
trustees and the U.S. Trustee’s office)  have the onerous task of 
monitoring compliance with the new restrictions by reviewing 
these financial disclosures in every case.18 
The substantial compliance and monitoring costs for this 
hunt for “abuse” have not provided significant benefits, and the 
entire enterprise of means testing has been revealed as a fool’s 
errand. In each of the five years since the adoption of the reform, 
only a miniscule percentage of debtors have been discovered to 
possess sufficient means to make significant payments to their 
creditors. Even the most hawkish supporters of consumer 
                                                          
 15  11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (2010). 
 16  See, e.g., NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR CREDIT COUNSELING, 
MEETING THE MANDATE: CONSUMER COUNSELING AND EDUCATION UNDER 
THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
(BAPCPA) 12 (2006); INSTITUTE FOR FINANCIAL LITERACY, FIRST 
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF POST-BAPCPA DEBTORS 4 & n.9 (2006). 
 17  See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2 (2005). 
 18  See Kilborn, supra note 3, at 119. 
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bankruptcy reform originally estimated that only about 10% of 
debtors might be excluded from Chapter 7 by the means test.19 In 
fact, as discussed immediately below, the actual figure has been 
much smaller than that. 
The “means test” was incorporated into an existing Code 
section that barred Chapter 7 relief for debtors in cases of 
“abuse.”20 Elaborating on the general notion of abuse of the 
bankruptcy process, this reformulated test specifically analyzes 
each debtor’s finances in two steps.21  If the debtor “passes” either 
step of the means test, abuse is not presumed based on ability to 
pay, and the case proceeds under the pre-reform law.22 As 
reported below, the overwhelming majority of debtors have 
“passed” one or both steps of this test in each of its first five years. 
Debtors pass the first step if their “current monthly 
income” (“CMI”) falls below a defined threshold.23 The contrived 
legalese concept of CMI bears little relation to reality or common 
sense, however, as that term connotes the average of the debtor’s 
monthly income over the past six months.24 Not surprisingly, 
most debtors visiting a bankruptcy lawyer have experienced an 
income disruption (e.g., unemployment, divorce, medical 
problem, and so on), so their backward-looking income is 
generally depressed, even if they do indeed possess the “means” to 
make future payments. This forces the means test to start on the 
wrong foot immediately. This fictitious CMI figure is then 
multiplied by twelve to produce an inaccurate assumed annual 
income, and this annual income is compared with the inflation-
adjusted median family income of a household of the same size as 
the debtor’s in the debtor’s state.25 Debtors with income at or 
                                                          
 19  See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, Bankrupt Criticisms: The Bankruptcy Bill 
Deserves to Pass, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 15, 2005), 
http://old.nationalreview.com/comment/zywicki200503150744.asp. 
 20  11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2010). 
 21  See Kilborn, supra note 3, at 117. 
 22  Id. at 118. 
 23  Id. at 117-118. 
 24  11 U.S.C. § 101(10). 
 25  11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(6)-(7). The applicable median figures are based on 
census data and consumer price indices and are available on the U.S. Trustee’s 
website at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/meanstesting.htm. For 
example, as of May 2012, the median gross (pre-tax) income for a family of 
three in Illinois, a relatively average state, is just under $70,000 per year.  U.S.  
Dep’t of Justice, Census Bureau Median Family Income By Family Size 
(Cases Filed On and After May 1, 2012), 
www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20120501/bci_data/median_ 
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below the applicable median are automatically not presumed 
abusive, and they are allowed into Chapter 7.26 As one would 
expect of people seeking debt relief, consistently around 90% of 
all debtors filing under Chapter 7 in the years since the 
implementation of the means test have passed this median-or-
below income test.27 
The 10% of debtors who must proceed to step two are 
required to subtract a series of actual or presumed expenses from 
their contrived above-average “current monthly income” figure to 
reveal whether significant “disposable income” remains for 
distribution to creditors.  If so, seeking Chapter 7 relief is 
“presumed abusive,” and such debtors must convert to Chapter 
13 payment plans if they want formal bankruptcy relief.28 After 
deducting standard monthly allowances for food, clothing, 
housing and transportation, in addition to amounts contractually 
due to secured and priority creditors in the next five years, abuse 
is presumed if the remainder exceeds about $180 per month (that 
is, an amount that would allow the debtor to pay creditors at least 
$11,725 over an imposed five-year plan).29 Unsurprisingly, given 
the rising expense of living in the United States, only a small 
fraction of debtors have failed this second step of the means test. 
In the first five post- reform years, fewer than 10% of the above-
median income debtors subjected to the second step of the means 
test have failed this second step, as well. 
That is, only about 1% of all Chapter 7 filers have been 
revealed as potential “abusers” of the quick relief of Chapter 7 
liquidation. Recall, however, that this abuse test is based on an 
artificial retrospective view of debtors’ incomes. One last safety 
valve allows the U.S. Trustee the discretion to decline to seek a 
dismissal or conversion to Chapter 13 in light of “special 
circumstances.”30 In a final ironic twist, the U.S. Trustee has 
                                                          
income_table.htm.  
 26  See Kilborn, supra note 3, at 118. 
 27  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM: 
ANNUAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS, FISCAL YEAR 2010, 19 
(2011), www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/annualreport/docs/ar2010.pdf. 
 28  See Kilborn, supra note 3, at 119. 
 29  11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). The actual dollar figure is indexed for 
inflation every three years, and the test is actually more complex than 
described. Debtors with more than $28,000 but less than $47,000 in unsecured 
debt can be denied access if their “disposable” income exceeds about $120 per 
month and over a 60-month plan would pay 25% of their unsecured debt (and 
at least $11,725). 
 30  See Kilborn, supra note 3, at 122-23. 
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exercised this discretion in at least half (in recent years, 60-70%) 
of the presumptively abusive cases in light of the “special 
circumstance” of debtors’ unemployment.31 If there is any truism 
in consumer bankruptcy, it is that most cases arise from job loss. 
The notion that identifying unemployment as a “special 
circumstance” is necessary to prevent dismissal of a Chapter 7 
case starkly reveals the utter disregard for reality in the U.S. 
bankruptcy reform. 
Despite the fact that only a fraction of 1% of Chapter 7 
filings are found to be “abusive,” debtors in every one of the 
nearly one million Chapter 7 cases filed each year must file a 
detailed description of how the means test applies to them.32 
Further, the case trustee must review every Chapter 7 case and 
file a statement explaining whether the debtor “passes” or “fails” 
the means test. In the cases in which the debtor fails the means 
test, but the U.S. Trustee declines to file a motion to dismiss 
based on “special circumstances,” the U.S. Trustee must explain 
in a written statement why a dismissal should not be imposed.33 
One might wonder why Congress imposed the time- and 
resource-intensive review of the complex means test on every case 
when fewer than 10% of cases were ever expected to “fail.” 
Unfortunately, Congress has not responded and is not expected to 
respond to the entreaties of overburdened debtors, lawyers, and 
trustees who face a pointless and unproductive paperwork review 
burden to weed out what has proven to be less than 1% of 
possibly abusive filings. 
C.  Poorly Drafted Provisions Overwhelm the Courts 
Compounding the compliance and monitoring costs in the 
means test, lawyers and the courts have struggled with a massive 
load of new disputes about poorly drafted provisions of the 
reform law. Indeed, though the U.S. Supreme Court accepts only 
a small fraction of all requests for certiorari review—generally 
100 or fewer cases per year—it has felt obliged to dedicate several 
precious slots on its docket in recent years to clean up the 
statutory mess created by BAPCPA.  Three disputes illustrate the 
problem. 
                                                          
 31  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 15, at 18. 
 32  11 U.S.C. §§ 704(b)(1), 707(b)(1), (2)(C) (2010). 
 33  Id. 
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1.  Debt Relief Agencies and Free Speech 
First, the reform law required bankruptcy lawyers to refer 
to themselves as “debt relief agencies” and to make required 
announcements in any advertising that they “help people file for 
bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code.”34 One would 
have thought that this would be entirely clear to anyone coming 
to a bankruptcy attorney’s office, but the more troublesome 
aspect of this reform was a restriction on the types of advice that 
bankruptcy lawyers could offer clients.  Debt relief agencies are 
forbidden to “advise [a bankruptcy client] to incur more debt in 
contemplation of [the bankruptcy case] or to pay an attorney or 
bankruptcy petition preparer fee or charge for services performed 
as part of preparing for or representing a debtor in a [bankruptcy] 
case.”35 
After a law firm challenged these new rules as a violation 
of the First Amendment free speech rights of lawyers and an 
undue interference in the client-lawyer relationship, the Supreme 
Court ultimately took the case to clarify the limited application of 
this new restriction. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that 
the superfluous and stigmatizing disclosure requirements were 
within Congress’s power, but the restriction on advice could be 
applied only to prevent advice that would be “abusive per se,” 
such as suggesting that a client take on debt for no other purpose 
than to take advantage of the discharge (as opposed to an 
independent, legitimate purpose, such as buying a more reliable 
car or refinancing a home mortgage).36 
All of this was entirely clear before BAPCPA, and any 
lawyer could and likely would have been sanctioned for offering 
such “abusive per se” advice in any event. These provisions have 
imposed significant costs on lawyers in needlessly redrafting their 
advertising and client communications. Moreover, these rules 
have caused a dead-weight loss of thousands of dollars and hours 
by lawyers and courts in litigating over these silly and pointless 
new rules. 
                                                          
 34  11 U.S.C. § 528. 
 35  11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4). 
 36  Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 
1336 (2010). 
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2.  Projected Disposable Income: Retrospective or Prospective 
Second, as discussed above, BAPCPA defines “disposable 
income” in a contrived, backward-looking way for testing 
Chapter 7 eligibility. It uses a similar term—”projected disposable 
income”—for testing the income to be applied to future payments 
in a Chapter 13 payment plan, however. Courts struggled to 
apply these two uses of the same statutory words in consistent 
ways, but many resisted using an artificial view of past income to 
control an evaluation of the debtor’s expected future income, 
especially when the facts clearly suggested a disconnect between 
the debtor’s income during these two time periods.37 
After several appellate courts interpreted these phrases in 
contradictory ways, the Supreme Court stepped in to fix the 
drafting mess that Congress had created. It held that “projected” 
must be interpreted in a way that allowed the court discretion to 
apply a “forward-looking test” and deviate from the “disposable 
income” calculation based on past income.38 If the debtor’s 
income would clearly be more or less in the future than it had 
been in the recent past, then courts could use that future 
projection in calculating the required payments under a Chapter 
13 plan, despite the wording of the statute.39 This decision was 
not unanimous.40 As he often does, Justice Scalia favored a 
“mechanical” test that applied the words that Congress chose in 
drafting the statute, no matter how absurd the result might be.41 
Once again, a careless drafting error, fueled by conservative 
politics, wreaked havoc in the courts, wasted countless resources, 
and damaged the lives of the poor debtors caught in the middle. 
3.  Deducting the Non-Expense of Vehicle Ownership 
Finally, perhaps the most sophistic dispute was the one 
most recently resolved by the Supreme Court. BAPCPA defined 
the debtor’s expense deductions for arriving at “disposable 
income” in terms of the standards used by the IRS (the federal tax 
service) in negotiating compromise arrangements for tax arrears.42 
One of these expenses is an “ownership” cost for a vehicle. The 
                                                          
 37  Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 U.S. 2464, 2467 (2010). 
 38  Id. at 2471. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. at 2482. 
 41  Id. at 2471. 
 42  11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
Kilborn Article Final (Do Not Delete) 11/29/2012  12:25 PM 
12 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 25:1 
IRS allows such an expense deduction, however, only if the 
debtor actually bears ownership costs; that is, if the debtor owns 
the car free-and-clear of any loan or lease expenses. No deduction 
is allowed for “ownership,” separate from a deduction for 
“operating” expenses, such as gas and maintenance. 
But BAPCPA did not clearly adopt the IRS application of 
these expense guidelines; it adopted the “applicable monthly 
expense amounts specified” in the IRS standards. Debtors’ 
lawyers argued, and some courts agreed, that this meant that any 
debtor who owned a vehicle could deduct the “amount specified” 
in the IRS guideline (that is, about $500 per car), whether or not 
the debtor owed any debt related to the car and would incur an 
actual ownership expense.43  Other courts held that the specified 
deduction was “applicable” only if the debtor actually had such 
an ongoing expense, so debtors who actually anticipated no 
expenditure for paying back a loan or lease obligation to own a 
car could take no deduction for this non-expense. In a ruling that 
came as little surprise to anyone, the Supreme Court adopted the 
latter position.44 This time- and resource-consuming quibbling 
over the meaning of the word “applicable” arose solely due to the 
quagmire of poor drafting in BAPCPA, and similar problems 
continue to plague the ongoing application of the reform law.45 
The losses from this ill-conceived and poorly implemented 
reform continue to mount with no end in sight.  From the 
perspective of system efficiency and effective social policy, 
BAPCPA represents an enormous step backward, a regulatory 
response that has made treating the casualties of financial market 
risks all the more inefficient, expensive, and cumbersome. Indeed, 
as usual, the most financially distressed and socially excluded 
suffer the most, as one of the greatest tragedies of the U.S. reform 
                                                          
 43  See, e.g., Tate v. Bolen, 571 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2009); Ross–Tousey 
v. Neary, 549 F.3d 1148, 1157 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 44  Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 723-25 (2011).  
Once again, Justice Scalia dissented, preferring a “plain meaning” approach to 
interpreting the word “applicable” as used by Congress in the law. 
 45  For example, a problem similar to that in Ransom arises with respect to 
vehicle ownership deductions for vehicles on which the debtor does bear an 
ownership expense at the time of filing, but which the debtor intends to avoid 
in the future by surrendering the vehicle to the secured creditor.  Here again, 
some courts allow a deduction for an expense that the debtor has at the time of 
filing but clearly will not incur going forward.  Perhaps the resolution of the 
Ransom case in the Supreme Court has implicitly resolved this related dispute, 
as well, though more likely another round of divided appellate decisions and 
more uncertainty will ensue. 
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was a marked rise in the cost of retaining an attorney to guide 
debtors through this now even more complex thicket of rules and 
traps. Many debtors who need and deserve relief are now priced 
out of this “market.” These problems will plague the U.S. system 
for years to come. 
II.  CLOSING THE DOORS TO THE DUTCH WSNP IN 2008 
Though not nearly as problematic as the U.S. debacle of 
BAPCPA, the reform of the Dutch consumer insolvency regime in 
2008 also continued chasing the dual chimeras of perceived 
“abuse” and a hope that debtors and creditors could simply work 
things out on their own outside of court. This reform, however, 
seems to have begun to slay a real dragon by avoiding wasteful, 
superfluous administrative complexity. These three concepts 
reflect the three primary goals of the first major reform of the 
Dutch Law on Debt Adjustment for Natural Persons (Wet 
schuldsanering natuurlijke personen, or Wsnp), effective January 
1, 2008. 
A.  Standardization and Reducing Administrative Complexity 
On the positive side, the Dutch reform pursued one clearly 
laudable end: to simplify the process and reduce the burden of 
excessive administrative complexity. Practice had shown that 
some of the central procedures of the new system were largely or 
entirely superfluous, especially those that allowed for broader 
discretion in crafting debt adjustment plans. Very little variation 
had appeared in the simple problem shared by debtors seeking a 
solution for a mismatch between limited incomes and burgeoning 
debts. The reform law thus abandoned the original approach of a 
flexible saneringsplan that relied on judicial discretion to craft 
“fair and reasonable” adjustment plans. Instead, it essentially 
codified a unitary model of income and expense allowances that 
judges and other insolvency professionals had developed in 
practice.46 Another prime example of relegating time-consuming 
and expensive procedures to virtual desuetude is the former 
requirement of a formal hearing for verifying creditors’ claims. 
                                                          
 46  See Raad voor Rechtsbijstand‘s Hertogenbosch, Bureau Wsnp, De 
Wsnp per 1 januari 2008: Wat wijzigt er? (October 2007), available at 
www.mvz.nl/docs_mvz/watverandert_wsnp.pdf; Kamerstukken II, 2004/05, 29 
942, nr. 3, pp 6-7, 38 (discussing new article 349a); Faillissementswet arts. 
295(3), 349a. 
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Because such hearings were actually held only in the minority of 
cases where a distribution to creditors was expected, the reform 
formally ratified this practice. It is difficult to gauge how these 
aspects of the reform have performed, in part because they 
represent little more than a legislative ratification of practice 
under the original law. In any event, these formalized 
simplifications must have at least maintained if not enhanced the 
system’s efficiency. 
B.  Restricting Entry To Those Who Are “Ready” 
The bigger story in the Dutch reform is at best a mixed 
success. The goal of avoiding “abuse” was questionable, and the 
reform’s impact here is harder to interpret. To make the system 
more efficient and effective for those admitted, reformers sought 
to reduce the number of unstable cases allowed into the system 
and, consequently, the number of unsuccessful adjustment plans 
ultimately converted to liquidation bankruptcy. To achieve this 
goal, the law was reformulated to encourage judges to exercise 
their discretion to bar the door to debtors who seemed “not ready” 
to comply with their obligations during the multi-year debt 
adjustment process. Homeless debtors and those with “psycho-
social problems” like drug addiction, for example, were targeted 
for diversion from the debt adjustment system until their 
financial situation had stabilized or their non-financial problems 
are “under control.”47 
The goal of reducing admitted cases seems to have been 
achieved with a vengeance, though as in the U.S., only 
temporarily.  In 2008 and 2009, filings plummeted 40% from the 
pre-reform level, from over 18,500 in the several years before 
2008 to about 11,000 in 2008 and 12,500 in 2009.48 Already by 
2010, though, filings had climbed nearly back to their pre-reform 
level.49 Moreover, the rate of admission of filed applications has 
changed relatively little (about 85% are admitted).50 The lower 
filing figures immediately following the 2008 reform might 
                                                          
 47  Faillissementswet art. 288. 
 48  See Marijke von Bergh et al., Raad voor Rechtsbijstand, Monitor 
Wsnp: Zesde meting 7-8 (2010), available at www.wsnp.rvr.org/pdf/ 
Monitor%20Wsnp%206e%20meting.pdf. 
 49  See Lia Combrink-Kuiters & Vinodh Lalta, Raad voor Rechtsbijstand, 
Monitor Wsnp: Zevende meting over het jaar 2010, at 13 (2011), available at 
www.wsnp.rvr.org/pdf/Monitor%20Wsnp%202010_TP.pdf. 
 50  See id. at 16 & tbl. 3.2. 
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indicate that more debtors avoided the system temporarily for 
fear that their applications would be rejected. If these people 
would have been, indeed, “not ready” to withstand the rigors of a 
multi-year payment plan on a strictly controlled budget, perhaps 
it is better that the system prevent their entry until they are 
prepared. It is hard to tell, however, exactly why such a sharp 
drop-off in filings ensued immediately following the effective date 
of the reform.  In any event, as in the U.S., a reform effort 
designed to depress filing levels has proven to be a decisive 
failure. 
C.  Increasing Voluntary Workouts 
One potentially brighter explanation for the lower filing 
figures may lie in the third goal of the reform, diverting more 
debtors to a voluntary workout with creditors outside the formal 
system. The constant pursuit of this chimera seems to have been 
met with success recently, but most likely not as a result of the 
Wsnp reform. The Netherlands has a long and impressive history 
of debt negotiation supported by a well-developed credit 
counseling infrastructure. The historical success of that extra-
judicial system had fallen to disappointing lows after the 
adoption of the formal Wsnp. By 2004, creditors accepted only 
9% of proposed out-of-court workout arrangements.51 The 
struggle to raise this success rate proceeded on two fronts. 
The first front was located within the reform effort of the 
formal debt adjustment system. The 2008 reform attempted to 
strengthen the debtor’s hand in negotiating extra-judicial 
workouts by adding a provision to allow the debtor to request 
that the court force a creditor to accept the debtor’s proposed out-
of-court plan “if the creditor could not reasonably have refused” 
to accept the debtor’s compromise plan, “in light of the imbalance 
between the [creditor’s] interest . . . and the interests of the debtor 
and of the other creditors who will be injured by the rejection.”52 
Not surprisingly, this attempt to encourage debtors to seek 
leverage from the courts has been an all but complete failure, 
since creditors reject such agreements primarily because debtors 
are simply unable to make an offer more convincing and 
attractive than what the Wsnp formally extracts from debtors 
                                                          
 51  For a discussion of the development of the unique Dutch credit 
counseling system and its struggles, see Kilborn, supra note 3, at 87-91, 94-97. 
 52  Faillissementswet art. 287a. 
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with court oversight.53 Such a forced compromise has been 
requested in only about 2000 cases in the first three years of its 
availability, in contrast to the about 30,000 formal Wsnp cases 
opened during this period.54 Indeed, of these 2000 requests, about 
40% were withdrawn without a decision from the court, and 
courts granted only about one-third.55 
The more successful effort was centered within the extra-
judicial counseling and negotiation system. In tandem with the 
reform of the Wsnp, the national coordinating association for 
credit counseling (Nederlandse Vereniging voor Volkskrediet or 
NVVK) reevaluated its own approach to debt negotiation in two 
key ways.  First, rather than treating every case as a suitable 
candidate for an out-of-court solution, counseling agencies 
implemented a sort of triage system.56 History had shown that the 
most financially overwhelmed debtors were clearly destined for 
the formal debt adjustment system, so counselors stopped 
resisting that inevitable result. Such debtors were simply 
prepared for and routed directly to the formal Wsnp system, with 
a certificate attesting that any attempt at a voluntary 
arrangement would be pointless. With fewer resources diverted to 
such hopeless cases, counselors could concentrate their efforts and 
enhance success rates in cases where an extra-judicial workout 
was a realistic objective. Second, and even more important, the 
NVVK had observed that one-third of unsuccessful negotiations 
failed as a result of rejection by one major creditor: the collections 
bureau for fines and penalties (Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau, 
generally called by its acronym, CJIB).57 The NVVK 
concentrated on convincing this one key creditor to support more 
out-of-court arrangements, a tactic that seems to have paid off. 
The rate of successful NVVK workout negotiations 
climbed to 22% in 2007, 34% in 2008, and 38% in 2010.58 The 
                                                          
 53  See Nick Huls, Nadja Jungmann & Bert Niemeijer, Can Voluntary 
Debt Settlement and Consumer Bankruptcy Coexist? The Development of 
Dutch Insolvency Law, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
303 (2003). 
 54  See Combrink-Kuiters & Lalta, supra note 49, at 42 & tbl. 5.1. 
 55  See id. 
 56  See Nederlandse Vereniging voor Volkskrediet, Jaarverslag 2010: 
Schulden, het kan iedereen overkomen 23 (2011), available at 
www.nvvk.eu/images/pdfs/NVVK%20jaarverslag%202010.pdf; see generally 
www.nvvk.eu/ (providing statistics and other information on counseling 
process). 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
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myriad of factors at play in these complex systems makes it 
impossible to conclude with confidence that one or another of the 
reform efforts was the silver bullet, but the great weight of 
available evidence suggests that the NVVK’s efforts clearly 
predominated over the legislative Wsnp reform effort in achieving 
these positive results. 
The Dutch reform illustrates a combination of the right 
and wrong ways to enhance system performance in a socially 
responsible way. Continuing to chase chimerical notions of 
“abuse” and creditor cooperation are likely to produce limited 
success at best, and, at worst, it will undermine the delivery of 
relief to those who need it. The striking but short-lived post-
reform decline of filings in the Dutch system seems likely to be 
largely a manifestation of this latter, unfavorable result. On the 
other hand, the Dutch reform is to be admired for engaging real 
problems and finally slaying the dragon of needlessly formalistic 
and wasteful administrative complexities and overcoming 
creditor resistance through direct, targeted negotiation with key 
creditor interests. This reform has moved the Dutch system in an 
admirably more effective results-oriented direction. 
III.  TRANSITION TO MOSTLY SUCCESSFUL: DENMARK 
(2005) AND SWEDEN (2007) 
Two prominent Scandinavian reforms mark the transition 
toward making real progress without taking significant steps 
backward. The very first consumer debt adjustment law in 
Europe has long resisted meaningful reform, and the 2005 
revision of the Danish law left in place a significant problem that 
leaves many debtors to languish in social exclusion, though it did 
manage to improve the lives of the few debtors this system 
admits. The Swedish law underwent a more thoroughgoing and 
effective reform in 2007, finally sloughing off old shibboleths and 
abandoning a long-standing and widespread quest for one 
particularly elusive chimera. 
A. Local Legal Culture Battles, Humanizing Unified Budgets in 
Denmark 
The persistent problem of “local legal culture” motivated 
the Danish reform of 2005. That is, substantial regional variation 
was observed in the ratio of applications to admissions and 
confirmed debt adjustment plans, as well as in the income and 
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expense allowances used by courts in arriving at debt adjustment 
plans.59 The reform addressed both areas, though only the latter 
seems to have enhanced system performance and social 
responsibility.60 
Because the Danish law broke new ground in allowing 
consumers relief from their debts, this system and the others in 
Scandinavia that it inspired have resisted extending relief beyond 
a relatively narrow band of particularly needy applicants. Fear of 
abuse of this extraordinary relief persists in Scandinavia more so 
than in most other regions, and a complex and bifurcated 
admissions test prevents most applicants from accessing the 
system. First, debtors must exhibit “qualified insolvency,” which 
implies a complete impossibility, free from virtually any doubt, 
that debtors might right their own financial ships in the 
foreseeable future by reducing their living standards and 
applying their best efforts to paying off debt.61 Second, the court 
has to be convinced that offering relief in any particular case is 
appropriate in light of a series of factors, such as the debtor’s 
efforts to manage debt problems and the composition of the debt 
load (preferably relatively few fines, penalties, and “irresponsible” 
debts, such as debts for luxury consumption).62 
The variety of inquiries implicit in these complex tests, 
especially the court’s evaluation of the debtor’s lifestyle and 
opportunities for belt tightening, have produced very significant 
regional variations among Danish courts. In 2002, for example, 
while the court in Odense admitted 66% of its 161 debt 
adjustment applications, the court in Roskilde admitted only 39% 
of 139 applicants, and the court in Copenhagen admitted a mere 
25% of 828 applications.63 Even beyond the entry point, courts 
took markedly different approaches to confirming debt 
adjustment plans for admitted applicants. While the court in 
Århus closed 41% of its 244 cases with a confirmed plan, the 
courts in Ålborg and Randers confirmed plans in only 19% and 
15%, respectively, of the 136 cases closed by each of those two 
courts, and as in most years, the Copenhagen court had a miserly 
                                                          
 59  See Jason J. Kilborn, Twenty-Five Years of Consumer Bankruptcy in 
Continental Europe: Internalizing Negative Externalities and Humanizing 
Justice in Denmark, 18 INT’L. INSOL. REV. 155, 174 (2009) (giving detailed 
discussion of the history and operation of the Danish system). 
 60  Id. at 172. 
 61  Id. at 165-67. 
 62  Id. at 168. 
 63  Id. at 175 (compiling data from official sources). 
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success rate of only 13% of its 8,689 closed cases.64 
These vast admissions and confirmation differentials were 
left largely unaddressed by the reform. The reform commission 
all but brushed aside criticisms of non-uniformity, noting 
ironically that it had no empirical data on the characteristics of 
admitted or rejected debtors, so it could not conclude that 
regional variations were not based on meaningful, objective 
variations among cases. It explicitly refused to undertake such 
studies itself because “the need for the changes in the current 
law . . . to a significant degree are independent of quantitative 
considerations.”65 
The reform law did take one small step away from the 
historical obsession with abuse, however. The second step of the 
admissions test originally operated on a presumption that debtors 
should not be admitted into the system unless the court was 
convinced that the totality of the circumstances militated in favor 
of admission. The reform reversed the presumption, which is now 
in favor of admission unless consideration of a slightly 
reformulated list of factors “suggests decisively against” relief.66 
Unfortunately, this has proven essentially to be a difference 
without a distinction. 
Striking regional variations persist, and while filings are 
up slightly, overall admission rates in the ensuing years have 
actually fallen. After a spike in admissions following the 2005 
reform, acceptance rates fell back to their former low levels and 
for many years have remained fairly steady at only about 40-45% 
(2,000-2,250 of about 5,000 applications annually).67 In light of the 
worldwide recession, in particular, the combination of rising 
filings and falling admissions suggests a system failing to address 
a rising incidence of pain; that is, a reform not performing well in 
reducing growing financial and social exclusion. 
                                                          
 64  Id. at 175 and n.145. The disparities are even greater in smaller 
districts, though the “small n” problem makes these data less compelling. For 
example, the court in Sæby admitted 86% of 28 applications, while the court in 
Ringsted admitted only 15% of 47 applications, and while the court in 
Nykøbing Mors confirmed a plan in 80% of 15 total closed cases, the courts in 
Skanderborg and Esbjerg confirmed plans in only about 12% of their 51 and 
93 closed cases. 
 65  Konkursrådets Betænkning nr. 1449/2004, at 46. 
 66  Konkurslov § 197 (“taler afgørende imod”). 
 67  See 
http://www.domstol.dk/om/talogfakta/statistik/Pages/skiftesager.aspx 
(author’s calculations based on data from the court administration’s statistics 
for newly undertaken debt adjustment cases (insolvensskifter)). 
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Turning the corner, however, there is a bit of good news in 
Denmark on regional variations in treatment of debtors within 
the system. The Danish law in its original formulation relegated 
debtors’ budgets and expense allowances to the discretionary 
judgment of courts as to what a “modest” lifestyle entailed. The 
wide variations in this standard prompted some counselors to 
suggest that their pre-bankruptcy clients move house from 
districts with especially miserly judges to nearby areas where 
relief was available on more livable terms. The 2005 reform 
achieved greater success in tackling this problem, charging the 
Justice Ministry with establishing uniform basic budgetary 
allowances. An unintended consequence of this unification effort 
was that the Justice Ministry took a substantially more humane 
approach to debtor support. On the expense side, the ministry’s 
basic budget allowance exceeded the upper range then applied by 
the courts in most debt adjustment cases by nearly 20%.68  On the 
income side, more types of income were reserved to debtors 
outright, such as transfer payments for children.69 More livable 
budgets are surely a positive social policy development in many 
quantifiable and unquantifiable ways. 
B.  Centralization, Simplification, and Expansion in Sweden 
The Swedish reform of 2007 achieved its stated goals of 
making the debt adjustment process simpler, more efficient, and 
thus more effective. It reduced a cumbersome three-step process 
to one step, and it concentrated authority in the actor most suited 
to administer the process intelligently, sensitively, efficiently, and 
effectively.70 From a quantitative perspective, this overhaul 
seems to have revved up performance in a very impressive way. 
In its original form, the Swedish debt adjustment law 
required debtors to traverse three distinct stages with different 
structures of authority.71 Step one required private negotiation 
with creditors, supported by budget counselors, much like in the 
Dutch system discussed above.72 Following the inevitable failure 
                                                          
 68  See Kilborn, supra note 59, at 178-79. 
 69  Id. at 160 n.22, 172, 174, 176-78. 
 70  See Jason Kilborn, Out with the New, In with the Old: As Sweden 
Aggressively Streamlines Its Consumer Bankruptcy System, Have U.S. Reformers 
Fallen Off the Learning Curve?, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435 (2007) (providing 
overview of the history and reform of the Swedish system). 
 71  See id. at 439. 
 72  See id. at 440. 
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of this search for creditor cooperation and a private solution, 
debtors would apply for formal relief in step two to the state 
Enforcement Agency (Kronofogdemyndigheten or KFM), who 
made admissions decisions on criteria quite similar to those 
described above in the Danish system.73 For those debtors 
admitted, the KFM was also responsible for drafting the debt 
adjustment plan for submission to a creditor vote.74 Creditors 
usually rejected this plan, so, in a third step, the Enforcement 
Agency would engage the courts for a judicial review and an all 
but inevitable imposition of the plan on creditors.75 
The 2007 reform slayed two major dragons. First, Sweden 
became the first state to scrap the required first step of seeking 
consensual compromise from creditors. Years of criticism of long 
delays and a fruitless waste of labor finally convinced legislators 
of the folly of chasing the chimera of cooperation from creditors.76 
Indeed, even many creditor representatives considered the 
required step of negotiation “nearly meaningless.”77 As the Dutch 
NVVK had discovered, removing the distraction of negotiation 
destined for failure would allow already razor-thin Swedish 
counseling budgets to be concentrated on cases that were good 
candidates for consensual workouts.78 
Second, like the other positive aspect of the Dutch reform, 
the Swedish reform eliminated the hyper-technical requirement of 
court imprimatur on debt adjustment plans. The courts also had 
complained of wasted time and resources in conscripting them to 
review cases where creditors objected to the KFM’s proposed 
plan on such abstract bases as “oppos[ition] to debt adjustment in 
principle.”79 Since the courts upheld the KFM’s proposed plan in 
the overwhelming majority of cases, court involvement in this 
process had proven to be little more than a “pure formality.”80 
The removal of the superfluous court-review process has 
made the system undeniably more efficient, and there has been no 
obvious increase in creditor complaints of administrative caprice 
in the treatment of claims. In the end, debtors’ limited incomes 
and payment ability constrain the options available to any system 
                                                          
 73  See id. 
 74  See id. 
 75  See id. 
 76  See id. at 458. 
 77  See id. 
 78  See id. at 459. 
 79  See id. at 460. 
 80  See id. at 460-61. 
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administrator—be it a court or an agency. As the Dutch also 
acknowledged in their 2008 reform, the role of discretion and the 
importance of the decision-maker here is limited at best.81 
Having jettisoned the unproductive first and third stages 
of the process, the newly lubricated Swedish debt adjustment 
system has been performing at nearly twice its pre-reform level. 
Filings nearly doubled in 2007 and remained at about that same 
level in 2008 and 2009 before spiking 20% in 2010 to nearly 
8,000.82 Moreover, though the Danish-style restrictive entry 
criteria were left largely unchanged, the percentage of applicants 
admitted into the Swedish system and offered relief has risen 
slightly from only about 50% up to and including 2007 to nearly 
70% in 2010.83 The Swedish reform of 2007 is among the finest 
examples of a performance-enhancing re-tooling that has really 
begun to make larger, lasting gains in the battle against 
administrative inefficiency as well as social exclusion and 
financial distress. 
 
IV. OPENING THE FLOODGATES IN GERMANY IN 2002 
Though a decade has passed since Germany last reformed 
its consumer insolvency law, the scope and effect of that reform 
were so impressive as to merit a brief mention among the real 
dragon-slayers. Before the December 2001 reform (effective in 
2002) of the consumer discharge provisions of the German 
Insolvenzordnung, the overwhelming majority of consumer 
insolvency cases were dismissed for “lack of estate” (mangels 
Masse84) to cover administrative costs.85 Not surprisingly, 
individuals struggling to pay their creditors were unable to scrape 
together the quite substantial sum required to cover expected 
costs for official publications, notices to creditors, and 
administration of the multi-year payment plan.86 Concern had 
also arisen regarding the ability of debtors to remain confined to a 
                                                          
 81  See id. at 469-70. 
 82  Kronofogden, Ärendestatistik: Skuldsaneringsärenden, available at 
www.kronofogden.se/20125.html (comparing filings and other statistics from 
2007 forward). 
 83  Id. 
 84  Insolvenzordnung § 26. 
 85  See Jason Kilborn, The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt 
Relief:Revolutionary Changes in German Law, and Surprising Lessons for the 
United States, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 257, 278-79 (2004). 
 86  See id. at 265. 
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subsistence-level budget for the original seven-year adjustment 
plan period, especially since the amounts allocated to debtors had 
not been increased in several years despite rising inflation.87 
The German legislature’s response to these two problems 
enhanced the performance of this system dramatically, though 
one’s evaluation depends, of course, on one’s perspective. As to 
the problem of financing the costs of administration, the ironic 
solution was to add another non-dischargeable debt to the 
debtor’s balance sheet. Under the so-called “forbearance model” 
(Stundungsmodel), case opening and administration fees can now 
be deferred until after the debtor’s completion of the multi-year 
rehabilitation plan, and the debt for these fees is not subject to 
discharge.88 
On the one hand, this reform resulted in an explosion of 
new filings, pushing the system to sustained performance levels 
that exceed most other similar systems. The mere hope for an 
impending reform fueled a 23% rise in applications in 2001, and 
in the first post-reform year, filings tripled to about 45,000 
petitions.89 Since then, filings by individuals have risen steadily to 
over 125,000 per year in every year after 2006, a rate of more than 
1.5 filings per German resident (among the three highest filing 
rates in Europe, along with France and England & Wales).90 For 
indigent debtors seeking relief, as well as for a system hoping to 
eliminate widespread suffering while enhancing debtors’ 
productive energies, this is a spectacular improvement. 
In light of the fact that many of these debtors are 
ultimately unable to repay the delayed filing fees and 
administration costs, however, these expenses have weighed more 
and more heavily on the judiciary budgets of the German states 
(Länder).91 From this perspective, the German system still faces 
significant performance challenges. Recent reform proposals 
would require low-income debtors to defray these costs at least 
                                                          
 87  See id. at 282-83. 
 88  InsO §§ 4a-4d, 26(1), 298, available at http://dejure.org/gesetze/InsO. 
 89  See Kilborn, supra note 70, at 287. 
 90  Historical filing data on file with author.  See also 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/Unterne
hmenHandwerk/Insolvenzen/Insolvenzen.html (providing current filing data). 
 91  Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Progress of Insolvency Law 
Reform, Welcoming Speech at the Eighth German Insolvenzrechtstag, 
available at 
http://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/2011/20110407_Achter_Insolvenzr
echtstag.html?nn=1356288 (last visited 10 Oct. 2012) (in German, Fortschritte 
der Insolvenzrechtsreform). 
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mildly during the course of their cases—approximately €20 to €25 
per month.92 
With respect to the problem of extended rehabilitation 
periods on depressed incomes, German legislators sensitively 
improved conditions for debtors by reducing the so-called “good 
behavior period” (the duration of the debt adjustment plan) from 
seven to six years and by reforming the general income exemption 
laws to increase the budgets for most debtors by nearly 50%, 
indexed bi-annually to keep pace with inflation.93 A shorter 
rehabilitation period on more livable income clearly represents a 
performance enhancement from the perspective of debtors and 
those who hope more debtors will make their way successfully 
through this arduous process. 
As a result of the heightened income protections, an 
estimated 80% of all cases in Germany today produce no 
dividend to creditors at all.94 If 80% of cases offer no payments to 
creditors, one might legitimately question the wisdom of 
expending substantial state revenue to administer this system of 
six-year “payment” plans if no payments are expected. The latest 
reform discussions from the Federal Justice Ministry suggest that 
an even more social policy-oriented proposal may emerge to halve 
the “good behavior period” to three years,95 though even with this 
further reform, it remains an open question whether the German 
system is performing well if the great bulk of cases impose an 
extended period of pain on debtors and an uncompensated 
administrative burden on the Länder with no obvious 
corresponding benefit (e.g., in terms of payment for creditors). 
One could deliver relief to debtors in a much more efficient and 
humane manner if relief and rejuvenation of debtors is the 
primary system objective. 
 
V.  MORE RELIEF, LESS ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IN 
FRANCE, 1999, 2004, 2010 
 
Over its 20-year lifespan, the French consumer insolvency 
                                                          
 92  See generallySkuldsanering 2012, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ 
http://www.bmj.de/DE/Recht/Rechtspflege/Insolvenzrecht/_node.html (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2012) (providing the latest statements and documents on 
insolvency law from the German Justice Ministry). 
 93  See Kilborn, supra note 71, at 267-68, 285-86. 
 94  See Kilborn, supra note 56, at 293. 
 95  See supra note 76. 
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system has undergone a gradual and impressive evolution toward 
offering broader and more effective relief to more debtors with 
less administrative distraction. This is a unique success story, the 
latest chapters of which are just now being written.  This final 
section will briefly sketch the two-decade progression of reforms 
in France and the general contours of its spectacular performance 
shifts over the past few years in particular.96 
The process of treating what is officially called in France 
“overindebtedness of individuals” (surendettement des 
particuliers) is commenced with the filing of a petition with a 
regional “commission on individual overindebtedness,” 
administered principally under the auspices of the Banque de 
France.97 Because this system arose in the earliest days of 
Europe’s struggles with consumer debt, it essentially combines 
what are often two separate mechanisms in other countries: debt 
counseling and insolvency treatment. 
In pursuit of the first, primary goal of the system, the 
regional commissions offer guidance to debtors in drawing up 
debt adjustment plans involving only minor concessions from 
creditors (e.g., reductions of accruing interest, extensions of 
repayment periods).98 In light of the mild modifications that 
many debtors require, and buttressed by the commissions’ power 
to “recommend” that a court impose these mild concessions on 
creditors who refuse to agree to the commission’s compromise 
plan, most situations of financial distress in France are (and 
always have been) addressed in this earliest and least intrusive 
stage of the process.99 That being said, the first performance 
indicator here suggests a significant shift: whereas roughly 70% 
of cases were disposed of with mild consensual workouts from the 
mid-1990s to 2000, that rate had fallen to just over half by 2008 
and 2009.100 
                                                          
 96  See Jason Kilborn, La Responsabilisation de l’Economie: What the 
United States Can Learn From the New French Law on Consumer 
Overindebtedness, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 619 (2005) (giving a detailed discussion 
of the development and operation of the various personal insolvency options 
in France). 
 97  See id. at 637-38. 
 98  See id. at 647. 
 99  See id. at 650. 
 100  See generally Statistiques mensuelles du surendettement, BANQUE DE 
FRANCE, www.banque-france.fr/la-banque-de-france/missions/protection-du-
consommateur/surendettement/statistiques-mensuelles-du-
surendettement.html (last visited Oct. 2012).  The comparative figures 
discussed here are drawn from the author’s own collection of years of these 
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One reason for the drop-off is that more effective 
alternatives to consensual workouts became available in 1999 and 
2004.101 Until 1999, the law did not allow either the commissions 
or the courts to impose a general discharge of unpaid debt.102 
Predictably, a “revolving door” phenomenon developed, with the 
commissions recommending temporary interest reductions and 
payment extensions, and debtors returning for more relief when 
these temporary, limited measures proved insufficient to 
overcome stubborn difficulties with debt service.103 
The first major reform of this system introduced a 
compelled discharge as a form of relief. Beginning in 1999, the 
commissions could recommend the “extraordinary” measure of a 
global deferral of all debts for three years (in 2004, reduced to two 
years).104 After this period, if the commission’s repeat evaluation 
revealed that the debtor was still unable to resolve a situation of 
financial distress using the traditional “ordinary” measures of 
payment extensions, etc., the commission could recommend that 
the court impose a partial or total discharge of the unmanageable 
debt burden.105 
When later surveys revealed that more than a quarter of 
all debtors had no ability to repay any of their debts, yet few 
debtors were receiving “extraordinary” discharge relief, the 
French legislature offered an even more aggressive option. 
Beginning in 2004, the commissions could recommend a 
liquidation of non-exempt assets and an immediate discharge for 
debtors in an “irremediably compromised” financial situation 
through a new “procedure of personal recovery” (procédure de 
rétablissement personnel or PRP).106 In both process and result, 
the PRP resembles quite closely a U.S. Chapter 7 consumer 
bankruptcy proceeding, offering a full and immediate discharge 
after liquidation of any valuable non-exempt assets (which are 
generally non-existent), with no rehabilitation plan of any kind.107 
In the past several years, the commissions appear to have 
comfortably oriented themselves among the variety of relief 
options, and they seem to be deploying those options aggressively 
                                                          
announcements, no longer available publicly). 
 101  See Kilborn, supra note 96, at 648-50. 
 102  See id. 
 103  See id. 
 104  See id. at 650. 
 105  See id. at 650-51. 
 106  See id. at 654-60. 
 107  See id. at 656. 
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to route cases in a way that achieves an optimal balance of relief 
and administrative efficiency. The commissions have 
accomplished this  by diverting a steadily growing percentage of 
cases to an immediate PRP discharge, from about 12% of all 
administered cases in 2004 and 2005 to about 20% in 2007 and 
2008, and over 30% in 2009 and after.108 Before November 1, 
2010, the remaining cases had to be forwarded to a court for an 
all but automatic judicial imposition of the commission’s 
recommended adjustment plan.109 Approximately two-thirds of 
these recommendations call for “extraordinary” measures of two-
year global debt enforcement moratoria, with about one-third 
recommending simple “ordinary” measures such as payment 
extensions and reduced interest.110 
With record-breaking filing figures every year (over 
230,000 in 2011) and an aggressive sorting system, the French 
consumer insolvency procedure seems to be firing on all cylinders 
already, but yet another efficiency-enhancing reform became 
effective on November 1, 2010.111 Two of the latest reforms are of 
particular interest in terms of performance, and they both 
promise to make significant contributions. 
The first innovative step follows the Swedish model of 
doing away with recourse to the judiciary for recommended 
“ordinary” measures. Now, the commissions need not obtain 
either unanimous creditor assent or court approval for workout 
plans not involving a discharge of debt; the commissions have 
their own authority to impose such plans on creditors.112 This will 
dispose of about 20,000 cases each year, freeing the judiciary from 
the burden of reviewing the commissions’ recommendations in 
cases that were almost without exception confirmed in due 
course.113 Creditors can appeal to the execution court against 
                                                          
 108  See generally BANQUE DE FRANCE, supra note 100 (percentages based 
on the total number of cases successfully administered each year, not rejected 
or closed without a consensual or imposed solution). 
 109  See Kilborn, supra note 96, at 648-50. 
 110  See id. 
 111  Loi no. 2010-737 du 1 Juillet 2010 [Law 2010-737 of July 1, 2010], 
Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 
2, 2010, no. 0150, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr /affichTexte.do 
?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022419094. 
 112  Code de la consommation art. L331-7, available at 
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT00000606
9565&idArticle=LEGIARTI000022423251&dateTexte=20120921 (July 1, 
2010). 
 113  Id. 
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these commission-imposed measures, but as in Sweden, appeal is 
the only means of judicial recourse against imposed ordinary 
measures of relief in France.114 
A second innovation is a radical simplification of the PRP 
route. As originally conceived, a PRP discharge had to be 
preceded by a court’s inventorying the debtor’s non- exempt 
assets (and debts) and conducting a liquidation of valuable non-
exempt assets. As has been the case overwhelmingly in Chapter 7 
liquidation cases in the United States, however, very few French 
debtors routed to the PRP had any assets worth liquidating. After 
November 2010, the commissions can recommend a personal 
recovery procedure without liquidation of assets in cases where 
the debtor possesses only household items that are necessary, of 
no market value, or the value of which would be “manifestly 
disproportionate” to the costs of sale.115 In such cases, which 
almost by definition will represent the great bulk of PRP cases, 
unless a creditor objects, the court need only confirm the 
commission’s recommendation and announce an immediate case 
closure and discharge.116 Given the rising number of cases 
directed toward an immediate PRP discharge, removing the 
charade of an inventory and liquidation where no real value is 
available will seriously lighten the judicial burden in this system. 
The French system continues its impressive evolution 
toward greater efficiency for both debtors and the state budget, 
permeated by a striking sensitivity to social policy concerns. One 
would be hard-pressed to find a better example of a consumer 
insolvency regime that has moved more decisively to expand and 
refine relief as part of a larger campaign against social exclusion. 
Over the past decade, relief has become steadily more available, 
on a broader scale, and in more focused and effective forms. This 
trend appears to be continuing in the latest round of reforms in 
France. In light of an impressive record of constant observation, 
analysis, and policy response to obstacles to effective debt relief, 
the consumer insolvency regime seems to have become one of the 
primary tools of modern French social policy. 
CONCLUSION 
To greater or lesser degrees, European consumer 
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bankruptcy regimes have responded well to efficiency concerns 
and the challenge of achieving social policy goals. The latest 
reforms have equipped these systems to discipline consumer 
financial markets more effectively and to administer the new 
market for relief more efficiently in responding to the casualties of 
recent financial crises. Also, to varying degrees, each of these 
systems continues to be distracted by an endless pursuit of the 
chimerical specter of “abuse,” even though identifiable cases of 
this problem are vanishingly few and difficult to identify.  The 
United States offers some of the worst examples of the 
undesirable effects of an infatuation with keeping imagined 
“hordes of sharpies”117 out of the relief system. Experience reveals 
that unsupported rhetoric and unchecked conservative political 
excess is the primary obstacle to meaningful reform. European 
nations largely seem to be moving past unfounded fears of the 
mythical monster of bankruptcy abuse, with profoundly 
beneficial and lasting results. At least in Europe, policymakers 
appear to have embraced insolvency regimes as an important tool 
for social policy and are gradually shifting their attention from 
imaginary threats to real ones. 
 
                                                          
 117  Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer 
Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 147 (1994). 
